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INTRODUCTION 
Since the inception of the National Football League 
Players‘ Association (NFLPA), collective bargaining in the 
National Football League (NFL) has had its fair share of ups 
and downs.1  Struggles over free agency, player salaries, 
player benefits, and the draft have resulted in multiple work 
stoppages.2  One issue at the forefront of collective bargaining 
is drug testing, but, unlike free agency and salary caps, the 
NFL and the NFLPA agree on their stance: ban the use of 
drugs.3  The health effects, public relations, and potential 
effect on the integrity of the game have both sides in 
accordance that a strict policy is necessary.4  The same 
bargaining process that resulted in the NFL‘s Drug Testing 
Policy (―the Policy‖), also resulted in successful bargaining 
since 1957.5  Although work stoppages did occur in the rich 
history of the league, the league ran successfully without any 
such stoppage since 1987.6  Instead, the NFL and NFLPA 
repeatedly extended their collective bargaining agreements 
(CBA) and, with increased pressure from Congress,7 made 
 
 1. See generally History, NFLPLAYERS.COM, http://nflpa.com/About-us/History/ 
(on file with author). 
 2. See id. at paras. 4, 6–7, 13–19, 22–29; see also Paul D. Staudohar, The Football 
Strike of 1987: The Question of Free Agency, 111 MONTHLY LAB. REV.  26, 26–30 (1988). 
 3. See The NFL StarCaps Case: Are Sports’ Anti-Doping Programs at a Legal 
Crossroads?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer 
Protection, 111th Cong. 34, 34–40 (2009) [hereinafter NFL Hearing] (testimony of 
DeMaurice Smith, Executive Director, National Football League Players Association).  
 4. NFL & NFLPA, NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE POLICY ON ANABOLIC STEROIDS 
AND RELATED SUBSTANCES, § 1 (2007) [hereinafter NFL POLICY]. 
 5. See History, supra note 1, at para. 2. 
 6. See Michael Wilbon, Possible NFL Lockout in 2011 Is Hot Topic on Eve of Super 
Bowl, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2010/02/05/AR2010020503094.html. 
 7. In 2005, Congress introduced four bills that would have regulated drug testing 
policies in sports.  See generally Office of National Drug Control Reauthorization Act, 
H.R. 2565, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005); Clean Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 2005); Professional Sports Integrity Act of 2005, H.R. 2516, 109th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2005); Drug Free Sports Act, H.R. 1862, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).  In 
proposing these bills, Congress did not mean to regulate drug testing, but rather meant 
to encourage the leagues to have more stringent penalties in their drug testing policies.  
See Hal Bodley, MLB Strikes Out Fines from Steroid Policies, USA TODAY, Mar. 21, 
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changes to the Policy that reflects the increased need to test 
players.8 
On September 11, 2009, however, the Eighth Circuit‘s 
decision in Williams v. National Football League placed the 
process of collective bargaining at risk.9  The Eighth Circuit, 
in affirming the District Court for the District of Minnesota, 
found that the players‘ statutory claims were not preempted 
under section 301 of the Labor Management Relation Act 
(LMRA).10  This decision effectively told the NFL and NFLPA 
that the bargaining process that resulted in over fifty years of 
successful CBAs and over twenty years of uninterrupted 
football was tainted.  The Eighth Circuit ignored the intent of 
Congress and the judicial impetus of section 301 preemption, 
putting the future of collective bargaining in professional 
sports in jeopardy.  On May 13, 2010, the NFL petitioned the 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari looking for a resolution 
of the issues surrounding interpretation of section 301 of the 
LMRA.11  On November 8, 2010, the Supreme Court denied 
the petition, avoiding resolution of the section 301 circuit 
split, and allowing the process of collective bargaining to 
remain at risk.12  On the heels of the Eighth Circuit‘s decision, 
and reflective of the concerns surrounding the Eighth 
Circuit‘s decision, the NFL entered its first work stoppage in 
almost twenty-five years, unable to agree on a new CBA.13 
This Comment will discuss the effect preemption has on 
state law claims regarding drug testing policies implemented 
in professional sports—focusing on section 301 of the LMRA—
using Williams v. National Football League as a case study.  
Part I will introduce the federal preemption doctrines as well 
as the preemption corollaries specific to labor law.  Part II 
will present the background of the Eighth Circuit‘s decision in 
 
2005, at C1; Steroid Penalties Much Tougher with Agreement, ESPN (Nov. 15, 2005, 
11:29PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2224832.   
 8. See Vinny DiTrani, NFL Deal Done; Owners Accept NFLPA Offer, RECORD, 
Mar. 9, 2006, at S01; see also Mark Maske & Leonard Shapiro, NFL Strengthens 
Steroid Policy, WASH. POST, April 27, 2005 at D08, available at http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/04/26/AR2005042601232.html. 
 9. 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 566 (2010). 
 10. See id. at 878–80. 
 11. See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Nat‘l Football League v. Williams, 
131 S. Ct. 566 (2010) (No. 09-1380), 2010 WL 1932622. 
 12. See Williams, 131 S. Ct. 566, denying cert. to, 582 F.3d 863. 
 13. Judge Backs Injunction to Halt NFL Lockout, Post to Yahoo! News, YAHOO! 
(Apr. 25, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20110425/sp_nm/us_nfl_dispute_3.   
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Williams v. National Football League.  Part III will analyze 
the NFL‘s drug testing policy as well as the two Minnesota 
state statutes at issue in the Williams case.  Part IV will 
discuss the ways in which the Eighth Circuit erred in its 
decision and the reasons why the state statutes at issue 
should have been preempted.  Furthermore, Part IV will 
discuss how the Eighth Circuit‘s decision effectively removed 
arbitrators from their role in the resolution of labor disputes.  
Part V will seek to reestablish the role of arbitrators by 
arguing that unions should be able to waive the judicial forum 
in favor of arbitration for state statutory claims, using the 
2009 decision of 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett14 as the basis for such 
a judicial waiver.   
I.  HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
A.  Preemption Doctrines Generally 
The Constitution seeks to strike a balance between state 
and federal interests by granting certain powers and rights to 
the federal government,15 limiting the state‘s power in certain 
circumstances16 and reserving the state‘s power in others.17  
Although states maintain certain powers, federal interests 
are given an overarching reach, as evidenced by the 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.18  The Supremacy 
Clause, which has been the foundation of many doctrinal 
findings of the judiciary,19 including preemption, states: ―This 
 
 14. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). 
 15. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  The clauses most pertinent to this 
discussion are the Commerce Clause, compelling Congress, ―[t]o regulate commerce 
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes[,]‖ id. at 
art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, allowing Congress, ―[t]o make all 
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing 
powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the 
United States, or in any department or officer thereof.‖  Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 16. See id. at art. I, § 10.   This section prohibits the states from, among other 
things, ―enter[ing] into any treaty, alliance, or confederation . . . ; without the consent of 
the Congress, [from] lay[ing] any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what 
may be absolutely necessary for executing it‘s inspection law . . . [; and] keep[ing] 
troops, or ships of war in time of peace[.]‖  Id. at art. I, § 10, cl. 1–3. 
 17. See id. at amend. X.  The Reserve Clause states that, ―[t]he powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.‖  Id. 
 18. See id. at art. VI, cl. 2.   
 19. The Dormant Commerce Clause is a doctrine of judicial interpretation, finding 
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Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .‖20   
In turn, courts have recognized three types of preemption: 
express, field, and conflict.21  Because Congress has no 
authority to pass laws outside of its constitutionally vested 
power, a finding of preemption presupposes that Congress 
acted within its proper scope.22  Express preemption occurs 
when Congress, enacts legislation that—through the 
legislation‘s plain language—specifically prohibits states from 
acting.23  Field preemption occurs when Congress acts with 
the intent to occupy an entire field, and state law 
impermissibly regulates within that field.24  Lastly, conflict 
preemption occurs when: (i) it is impossible to comply with 
both the state and federal law,25 or (ii) the state law frustrates 
congressional intent or ―stands as an obstacle to [its] 
accomplishment.‖26 Although all three doctrines contain 
different means for evaluation, the main objective of the 
preemption doctrine is to determine congressional intent.27  
Ultimately, if a conflict exists between a federal interest or 
law and a state law, the state law will be ―preempted,‖ 
meaning it cannot be maintained due to the risk of frustrating 
congressional intent.28 
B.  Labor Law and Preemption 
In labor law, the Supreme Court has identified three 
 
state laws that discriminate against out-of-state entities, or significantly burden the 
flow of interstate commerce, invalid.  See Amy M. Petragnani, The Dormant Commerce 
Clause: On Its Last Leg, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1215, 1216–19 (1994). 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.   
 21. Stephen F. Befort & Byran N. Smith, At the Cutting Edge of Labor Law 
Preemption: A Critique of Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 20 LAB. LAW. 107, 109 
(2004); Mary J. Davis, On Preemption, Congressional Intent, and Conflicts of Laws, 66 
U. PITT. L. REV. 181, 198–99 (2004). 
 22. See Davis, supra note 21, at 182. 
 23. Befort & Smith, supra note 21, at 109; see also Davis, supra note 21, at 198–99. 
 24. See Befort & Smith, supra note 21, at 109; see also Davis, supra note 21, at 199. 
 25. Befort & Smith, supra note 21, at 109; Davis, supra note 21, at 199. 
 26. Davis, supra note 21, at 199 (citing Hillsborough Cnty v. Automated Med. 
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712–13 (1985)). 
 27. See Befort & Smith, supra note 21, at 109–10; see also Davis, supra note 21, at 
183. 
 28. See Befort & Smith, supra note 21, at 109. 
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strands of preemption, all practical examples of field 
preemption:29 Garmon preemption,30 Machinists preemption,31 
and section 301 preemption.32  These doctrines all derive from 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and, in inferring 
congressional intent, seek to preclude state actions where the 
federal scheme should control.33   
1. Garmon Preemption 
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, the 
Supreme Court sought to answer the question whether a state 
court, having no jurisdiction to enjoin peaceful union activity, 
could award damages arising out of the same activity.34  After 
the employer failed to agree to retain only union members, 
the union in Garmon picketed for the purpose of encouraging 
union participation.35  The Superior Court for the County of 
San Diego (―California court‖) enjoined the picketing and 
awarded damages.36  The Supreme Court found that the state 
court could not enjoin the action, even if the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) declined jurisdiction.37  On remand, 
the California court upheld the damages, while setting aside 
the injunction.38  In finding the California court‘s issuance of 
damages inappropriate,39 the Supreme Court held, ―[w]hen an 
activity is arguably subject to [section] 7 or [section] 8 of the 
[NLRA], the States as well as the federal courts must defer to 
the exclusive competence of the [NLRB] if the danger of state 
interference with national policy is to be averted.‖40  Thus, the 
California courts could not award damages arising from 
activity the court had no jurisdiction to enjoin in the first 
 
 29. See Henry H. Drummonds, Reforming Labor Law by Reforming Labor Law 
Preemption Doctrine to Allow the States to Make More Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA. L. 
REV. 97, 164 (2009). 
 30. See generally San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
 31. See generally Lodge 76, Int‘l Ass‘n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. 
Emp‘t Relations Comm‘n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976). 
 32. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185 
(2006); see also Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988). 
 33. See Befort & Smith, supra note 21, at 109–10. 
 34. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 239. 
 35. Id. at 237. 
 36. Id. at 237–38. 
 37. Id. at 238.   
 38. Id. at 239. 
 39. Id. at 248. 
 40. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 245 (emphasis added). 
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place.  In holding so, the Court reiterated two important 
exceptions to this area of preemption: (1) ―Where the 
regulated conduct touch[s] interests [] deeply rooted in local 
feeling and responsibility,‖41 and (2) ―where the activity 
regulated [is] a merely peripheral concern of the [LMRA],‖ the 
state court may act.42  
2. Machinists Preemption 
In Lodge 76, International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace 
Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, the 
court sets forth the second strand of labor law preemption.43  
Machinists involved a union‘s refusal to have employees work 
overtime after the employer unilaterally imposed longer 
hours.44  The employer filed a charge with both the NLRB and 
the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC).45  
The Regional Director of the NLRB dismissed the unfair labor 
practices charge, finding the union was not in violation of the 
NLRA.46  The WERC then tried the case and found the union‘s 
action an unfair labor practice and ordered the union to cease 
and desist.47  In finding the WERC‘s decision preempted,48 the 
Supreme Court held that preemption depends upon whether 
Congress wanted the conduct to be unregulated, or, ―to be 
controlled by the free play of economic forces.‖49  This inquiry 
derives from the belief that a certain activity may be 
―protected‖ when it is ―intended to be ‗unrestricted by [a]ny 
governmental power to regulate‘ because it was among the 
permissible ‗economic weapons in reserve . . . .‘‖50  
 
 41. Id. at 244 (alteration in original). 
 42. Id. at 243 (alteration in original) (citing Int‘l Ass‘n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 
356 U.S. 617 (1958)). 
 43. 427 U.S. 132 (1976). 
 44. Id. at 134. 
 45. Id. at 135. 
 46. Id. at 135–36. 
 47. Id. at 136.  
 48. Id. at 155. 
 49. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. at 140 (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch 
Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)). 
 50. Id. at 141 (emphasis added) (quoting NLRB v. Ins. Agents‘ Int‘l Union, 361 U.S. 
477, 488–89 (1960)). 
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3. Section 301 Preemption 
The third strand of labor preemption derives from section 
301 of the LMRA.51  Section 301 states: 
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 
organization representing employees in an industry affecting 
commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor 
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United 
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the 
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the 
parties.52 
Section 301 compels the use of federal laws to ensure the 
uniform interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.53  
When negotiating, the fear of state action places an 
unreasonably high burden on the negotiating parties to 
formulate an agreement that complies with every possible 
state law.54  Although section 301 recognizes the problems 
associated with conflicting state laws and encourages 
collective bargaining, Congress intended for parties to freely 
bargain only within the basic constraints of state law.55  Thus, 
subject to section 301 preemption, parties cannot agree to 
provisions that would be illegal under state law.56  In 
balancing the sometimes-conflicting interests of collective 
bargaining and state rights, the test for section 301 
preemption has been developed to consist of two separate 
prongs.57  First, a state-law claim is preempted if the claim 
itself is based on a violation of a specific term of the CBA.58  
As an example, this would encompass breach of contract 
claims.  Second, a state law claim is preempted by section 301 
if the claim ―is ‗dependent upon an analysis‘ of the relevant 
 
 51. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 
185(a) (2006); see also Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988). 
 52. § 301(a). 
 53. Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Lucas 
Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103 (1962). 
 54. See id. at 103–04. 
 55. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 395 (1987) (citing Allis-Chalmers 
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 212 (1985)). 
 56. See id. (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 212). 
 57. Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 874 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing 
Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 500 F.3d 828, 832 (8th Cir. 2007)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
566 (2010). 
 58. See id. 
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CBA‖59  This second prong ultimately means that, ―if the 
resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a 
[CBA], the application of the state law is preempted and 
federal labor law principles—necessarily uniform throughout 
the Nation—must be employed to resolve the dispute.‖60   
Section 301 has ―extraordinary preemptive power.‖61  It 
extends to any claim that finds itself ―inextricably intertwined 
with consideration of the terms of the labor contract,‖62 or 
―substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an 
agreement made between the parties in a labor contract.‖63  
Preemption deriving from section 301 of the LMRA recognizes 
the unique relationship among bargaining parties and seeks 
to foster the relationship by mandating the application of 
federal law in the interpretation and enforcement of any 
CBA.64  
Congress also promulgated section 301 with the intention 
of encouraging parties to agree to terms providing for binding 
arbitration proceedings.65  Congress codified this intention in 
section 203(d) of the LMRA which states: ―Final adjustment 
by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to 
be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes 
arising over the application or interpretation of an existing 
[CBA].‖66  Although the decision to agree to arbitration is 
completely voluntary, the intent of the parties is binding.67  If 
the parties decide to include a provision for grievance 
arbitration, and a court finds that a claim is preempted by 
section 301, only an agreed upon forum—including the forum 
of arbitration—should be used to interpret the CBA.68   
 
 
 59. Id. (quoting Bogan, 500 F.3d at 832). 
 60. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405–06 (1988). 
 61. Shane v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 
Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 394 (citing Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 88 S. Ct. 
1235, 1236 (1968)). 
 62. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985). 
 63. Id. at 220. 
 64. See Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964)) (finding that 
claims arising under a collectively bargained for agreement give way to a ‗new common 
law‘ of the labor agreement). 
 65. See Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. 
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104–05 (1962). 
 66. 29 U.S.C. 173(d) (2006) 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
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II.  WILLIAMS V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 
On December 2, 2008, six players were suspended from the 
NFL for failing a mandatory drug test.69  In response, two 
players from the Minnesota Vikings—Pat Williams and Kevin 
Williams—appealed their suspensions through the Policy-
mandated grievance procedure.70  After their suspensions 
were sustained, the Williamses sued the NFL in a Minnesota 
state court, alleging various violations of Minnesota common 
law.71  That same day, the court blocked the suspensions and 
issued a temporary restraining order.72  The NFL then 
removed the case to federal court.73  Once in federal court, the 
Williamses amended their complaint, alleging two statutory 
claims: (1) violation of Minnesota‘s Drug and Alcohol Testing 
in the Workplace Act (DATWA), and (2) violation of 
Minnesota‘s Consumable Products Act (CPA).74  In response, 
the NFL filed a motion for summary judgment.75  The district 
court granted the NFL‘s summary judgment motion in part—
finding the Williamses‘ common law claims preempted by 
section 301 of the LMRA—and denied the motion in part—
remanding the statutory claims to state court.76  The Eighth 
Circuit affirmed the totality of the district court‘s decision.77  
In doing so, the Eighth Circuit found that adjudication of the 
statutory claims did not require interpretation of the CBA; 
instead, the claims were independent of the CBA and thus not 
preempted by section 301 of the LMRA.78  The court did hold, 
however, that the state common law claims were preempted 
because those claims depended upon interpretation of the 
CBA.79   
 
 69. Saints McAllister, Vikings’ Williamses Among Suspended, ESPN (Dec. 3, 2008, 
3:36 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3740122. 
 70. See Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 566 (2010). 
 71. Id. at 871–72. 
 72. Id. at 872. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. See id. at 872. 
 76. Williams, 582 F.3d at 872–73. 
 77. Id. at 886. 
 78. See id. at 878, 880. 
 79. See id. at 881–82. 
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A.  State Statutory Claims 
The Eighth Circuit explicitly found that an employee‘s 
mere membership in an entity governed by a CBA does not 
insulate the employer from state statutory claims.80  Most 
notably, the court held 
[W]here there is a CBA that is at least as protective of employees 
as [the] DATWA, the number of possible claims an employee has 
against his or her employer will be affected.  Where the employer 
complies with [the] DATWA but not with its CBA that provides 
greater protection, the employee could have [sic] only a claim for 
breach of contract.  Where the employer does not comply either 
with [the] DATWA or its CBA that provides equivalent or greater 
protection than [the] DATWA, the employee could potentially have 
two claims, a claim for breach of contract and a DATWA claim.81 
The NFL made three arguments regarding Minnesota‘s 
DATWA: (1) The claim turns on analysis of the Policy to find 
out whether it ―meets or exceeds‖ the statutory requirements; 
(2) the claim requires interpretation of the Policy to find out if 
the NFL qualifies as an employer; and (3) uniform 
interpretation of the Policy is necessary to preserve the 
integrity of the game.82 
While comparing the Williams facts against the facts in 
Karnes v. Boeing Co.,83 the court held that determining 
whether the NFL‘s policy was at least as protective as the 
DATWA was a factual dispute, which the court believed it 
could not preempt under section 301.84  In Karnes, an 
employee brought an action against his employer for firing 
him in violation of Oklahoma‘s Standards for Workplace Drug 
and Alcohol Testing Act (OSWDATA).85  The court noted that 
the OSWDATA said that ―[n]o disciplinary action, except for a 
temporary suspension or a temporary transfer to another 
position, may be taken by an employer against an employee 
based on a positive test result unless the test result has been 
confirmed by a second test.‖86  In Williams, the court noted 
 
 80. See id. at 875. 
 81. Id.  
 82. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 873. 
 83. 335 F.3d 1189 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 84. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 876 (citing Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 
246, 261, 266 (1994)). 
 85. See Karnes, 335 F.3d at 1192. 
 86. See id. at 1193 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 40, § 562(A) (2010)). 
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that the plaintiff in Karnes merely needed to show that 
―Boeing (1) discharged him based on his drug test, and (2) 
failed to confirm the results through a second test.‖87  The 
court determined that both of these findings were merely 
factual and did not require interpretation of the CBA.  As a 
result, the Williams court held that the Williamses‘—as the 
court saw it comparable—claims were not preempted under 
section 301 of the LMRA.88   
The Williams court also determined that it simply needed 
to reference the CBA in order to define ―employer‖ instead of 
actually interpreting or analyzing the agreement.89  The 
Williams court—consistent with previous case law on section 
301—noted that preemption occurs only where interpretation 
of a CBA is necessary.90  Therefore, courts have been quick to 
distinguish cases ―which require interpretation or 
construction of the CBA from those which only require 
reference to it.‖91  The Eighth Circuit asserted that resolution 
of the DATWA claim merely required reference to the 
preamble.92  Specifically, the court noted that the players 
accept employment by a member club of the NFL, which 
cannot create a preemptive effect.93  More importantly, the 
court also found that the players‘ contracts, which referenced 
the NFL‘s employer status, were not a part of the CBA and 
thus the issue did not require any interpretation of the CBA.94  
Without interpretation of the CBA itself, section 301 
preemption was completely improper.95 
Finally, the court reasoned that the need for uniform 
policies in the NFL could not overwhelm valid state laws and 
that the interest itself could not mandate preemption.96  By 
analogizing Williams to Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, 
Inc.,97 the Eighth Circuit rejected preemption.98  In Cramer, 
 
 87. Williams, 582 F.3d at 876 (quoting Karnes, 335 F.3d at 1193). 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. (citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124–25 (1994)).  
 90. See id. 
 91. Id. (quoting Trs. of Twin City Bricklayers Fringe Benefit Funds v. Superior 
Waterproofing, Inc., 450 F.3d 324, 330 (2006)). 
 92. See id. at 877. 
 93. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 877. 
 94. See id.  
 95. Id. at 876–77. 
 96. See id. at 877–78. 
 97. 255 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 98. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 877–78.  
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the employer argued that the CBA should ―supersede 
inconsistent state laws.‖99  The court rejected the employer‘s 
argument, noting that the ―LMRA certainly did not give 
employers and unions the power to displace any state 
regulatory law they found inconvenient.‖100  Following the 
rationale of the Cramer court, and because the Eighth Circuit 
found drug testing policies to be a non-negotiable state right, 
it opined that parties could not negotiate for what was illegal 
under state laws and held that the DATWA was not 
preempted.101 
Aside from the DATWA, the NFL also argued that the 
CPA claims were preempted under section 301 because: (1) 
deciding whether to list bumetanide as a banned substance 
qualifies as a bona fide occupational requirement, compelling 
interpretation of the CBA, and (2) determining whether the 
use was ―off the premises of the employer‖ and during ―non-
working hours‖ requires the state court to analyze the CBA.102  
The court rejected these arguments, and in doing so, took an 
extremely narrow approach to section 301 preemption.103  The 
court opined that it could only look at the claim, and not 
toward any affirmative defense, to determine whether section 
301 should preempt the claim.104 
B.  State Common Law Claims 
The Eighth Circuit, in upholding the district court, found 
that the state common law claims were preempted, unlike the 
Williamses‘ statutory claims.105  The court stated that any 
claim of duty owed by the NFL depends specifically on ―the 
parties‘ legal relationship and expectations as established by 
the CBA and the Policy.‖106  In concluding so, the court found 
that section 301 preempted the claims of breach of fiduciary 
duty, negligence, and gross negligence.107  Regarding the 
fraud claims, the court found that reasonable reliance on a 
 
 99. 255 F.3d at 695 n.9. 
 100. Id. (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1985)). 
 101. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 874 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 211–12) 
(emphasis added). 
 102. See id.  
 103. See id. at 879 n.13. 
 104. See id.  
 105. See id. at 883. 
 106. Id. at 881. 
 107. Williams, 582 F.3d at 881. 
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lack of warning, ―cannot be ascertained apart from the terms 
of the Policy.‖108  Finally, regarding the intentional infliction 
of emotional distress claim, the court found that ―one can only 
evaluate the outrageousness of the NFL‘s conduct . . . in light 
of what the parties have agreed to in the Policy.‖109   
III.  THE NFL POLICY AND THE MINNESOTA STATUTES 
A.  The NFL’s Drug Testing Policy 
In 1989, the NFL and the NFLPA came together and 
approved the league‘s first Drug Testing Policy.110  Although it 
has changed numerous times,111 the Policy employs rules, 
testing procedures, and disciplinary actions, which are 
executed when players either fail to follow procedures or fail a 
drug test.112  The NFL and NFLPA agreed to the Policy due to 
a concern with the players‘ use of prohibited substances.113  
There are three factors upon which this concern is founded: 
(1) the fact that use of performance enhancing drugs 
―threaten the fairness and integrity of the athletic 
competition on the playing field[,]‖114 (2) concerns with ―the 
adverse health effects of steroid use[,]‖115 and (3) the 
overarching concern that ―the use of Prohibited Substances by 
NFL players sends the wrong message to young people who 
may be tempted to use them.‖116  The NFL procedure applies 
to all players, present and future, who have not formally 
retired from the NFL.117  Testing of players may occur during 
pre-employment, the pre-season, the regular season, or based 
on reasonable cause for players with prior positive tests or 
 
 108. Id. at 882 (finding two specific sections—‖Masking Agents and Supplements‖ 
and ―Supplements‖—particularly important in determining whether the players 
reasonably relied on a lack of warning that the product taken contained a banned 
substance). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Judy Battista, How Good Is the ‘Best’ Drug Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 
2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/14/sports/football/14Drugs.html?_r=1. 
 111. See id.; see also Mike Reiss, NFL Strengthens Drug Policy, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 
25, 2007, http://www.boston.com/sports/articles/2007/01/25/nfl_strengthens_drug_ 
policy/. 
 112. See generally NFL POLICY, supra note 4. 
 113. Id. § 1. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id.  
 117. Id. § 2(A). 
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other circumstances.118  The Policy outlines mandatory testing 
procedures and sets forth disciplinary procedures for both 
failure to comply with the procedures and positive test 
results.119  The Policy is one of strict liability: players are 
completely responsible for what goes into their bodies and the 
league disciplines them accordingly.120  The Policy also sets 
forth an arbitration procedure under which any player may 
challenge a positive test result or disciplinary action.121  The 
Commissioner reviews the arbitration result, and the ensuing 
result is binding upon the player.122 
B.  Minnesota’s State Laws 
1. Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace Act  
The DATWA sets forth drug testing guidelines which are 
to be adopted by private employers.123  Minnesota‘s drug 
testing policies have long been among the most restrictive, 
setting up strong protective policies for the state‘s resident 
employees.124  At the very minimum, under the DATWA, a 
written policy must contain: 
(1) The employees or job applicants subject to testing under the 
policy; 
(2) The circumstances under which drug or alcohol testing may be 
requested or required; 
 
 118. NFL POLICY, supra note 4, § 2(A). 
 119. A first violation of the Policy results in a minimum suspension of four games 
without pay.  Id. § 6.  If fewer than four games remain, the suspension is carried over 
into the next regular season, until the player misses four games.  Id.  A second violation 
of the Policy results in a minimum suspension of eight games without pay.  Id.  If fewer 
than eight games remain, the suspension is carried over into the next regular season, 
until the player misses eight games.  Id.  A third violation of the Policy results in a 
minimum suspension of twelve months without pay.  Id.  After twelve months a player 
may petition for reinstatement.  Id.   
 120. Id. § 3(E). 
 121. See id. § 10. 
 122. Until the outlined appeals process is completed, any given disciplinary action, 
including suspension, will not take effect.  Id.  
 123. See generally MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.950–.957 (2009).  Although the statute 
was amended in 2010, the version analyzed in this Comment is the pre-2010 version. 
 124. See V. John Ella, What Do They Have in Mind? Minnesota’s Drug-Testing Law 
Turns 20, BENCH & B. MINN., Sept. 2007, at 22–23.  The other areas viewed as ―anti-
drug testing‖ are much of the Northeast and Puerto Rico.  Id.  In contrast, the Rockies 
and the South are generally considered ―pro-drug testing.‖  Id. 
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(3) The right of an employee or job applicant to refuse to undergo 
drug and alcohol testing and the consequences of refusal; 
(4) Any disciplinary or other adverse personnel action that may be 
taken based on a confirmatory test or request and pay for a 
confirmatory retest; and 
(5) Any other appeal procedures available.125 
The statute also establishes procedural protections, 
requiring employers to test outside of the workplace, and to 
have all specimens sent to a licensed, accredited, or certified 
laboratory.126  The DATWA places limits on disciplinary 
action that may be taken based upon a failed test,127 and 
makes allowances for retesting,128 as well as explanations for 
a failed test.129  Although the statute outlines minimum 
guidelines, it also leaves room for private/collectively 
bargained agreements.130  As such, the sections of the statute 
―shall not be construed to limit the parties to a collective 
bargaining agreement from bargaining and agreeing with 
respect to a drug and alcohol testing policy that meets or 
exceeds, and does not otherwise conflict with, the minimum 
standards and requirements for employee protection provided 
in those sections.‖131 
2. Consumable Products Act  
Minnesota‘s CPA regulates employer conduct respecting 
employees‘ nonworking activities.132  This act prohibits 
employers from refusing to hire, or disciplining a current 
employee, for use of lawful consumable products, if the use of 
said products occurs off the premises and during nonworking 
hours.133  This law, however, does contain important 
exceptions.  The CPA explicitly states, in relevant part, that it 
is not a violation of the statute ―for an employer to restrict the 
use of lawful consumable products by employees during 
 
 125. § 181.952(1)(1)–(5). 
 126. § 181.953. 
 127. § 181.953(10). 
 128. § 181.953(9). 
 129. § 181.953(6)(b). 
 130. § 181.955(1). 
 131. Id. (emphasis added). 
 132. See generally Id. § 181.938. 
 133. § 181.938(2). 
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nonworking hours if the employer‘s restriction: (1) relates to a 
bona fide occupational requirement and is reasonably related 
to employment activities or responsibilities of a particular 
employee or group of employees . . . .‖134  The Minnesota 
legislation specifically left room for employers with particular 
needs to set greater restrictions regarding testing policies.135  
In doing so, the legislature recognized the differences that 
exist between different types of employment.136 
IV.  EIGHTH CIRCUIT ERRS IN DISMISSING ARGUMENT OF 
PREEMPTION137 
In its holding, the Eighth Circuit erred in two major 
respects: (1) not extending the reasoning for preemption of the 
state common law claims to the state statutory claims,138 and 
(2) taking the narrow approach to section 301 preemption by 
ignoring affirmative defenses.139  Both of these errors are 
discussed below. 
 
 134. § 181.938(3)(a)(1) (emphasis added).  In full the CPA notes that it is not a 
violation: 
(a) [F]or an employer to restrict the use of lawful consumable products by    
employees during nonworking hours if the employer‘s restrictions: 
(1) relates to a bona fide occupational requirement and is reasonably 
related to employment activities or responsibilities of a 
particular employee or group of employees; or 
(2) is necessary to avoid a conflict of interest or the appearance of a 
conflict of interest with any responsibilities owed by the 
employee to the employer 
(b) [F]or an employer to refuse to hire an applicant or discipline or discharge 
an employee who refuses or fails to comply with the conditions 
established by a chemical dependency treatment or aftercare program.[…] 
(c) [F]or an employer to refuse to hire an applicant or discipline or discharge 
an employee on the basis of the applicant‘s or employee‘s past or present 
job performance. 
§ 181.938(3). 
 135. See § 181.938(3)(a)(1). 
 136. See id. 
 137. On December 14, 2009, the Eighth Circuit denied the NFL‘s motion for a 
rehearing en banc.  See generally See Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 598 F.3d 932 
(8th Cir. 2009).  Four judges dissented from the denial, and found fault in the Eighth 
Circuit‘s original analysis.  See id.   
 138. See generally Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 582 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2009), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 566 (2010). 
 139. See id. at 879 n.13. 
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A.  Common Law Application to Statutory Claims 
According to Williams, section 301 compels preemption of 
a state claim where: (1) the CBA creates specific duties such 
that the claims can be considered ―based on‖ the agreement, 
or (2) resolution of the complaint would necessitate 
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.140  The 
state common law claims in Williams were preempted 
because the court found such interpretation of the CBA 
necessary.141  The thread that bound the common law claims 
together—and thus allowed them to be preempted—was the 
presence of a relationship between the parties and the need to 
evaluate that relationship to determine the strength of the 
claims by the player-employees.142   
The reasoning used to preempt the common law claims can 
and should carry over to the statutory claims.  The actual 
determination of whether an employer has breached its 
obligation under the DATWA and CPA is a factual dispute 
and the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on the factual nature of 
this dispute in disallowing preemption.143  The problem, 
however, is that the common law claims which were 
preempted, at their essence, are also factual disputes.  The 
outrageousness of conduct, the reasonableness of 
expectations, and an employer‘s duty are all factual issues to 
be resolved by a fact finder.144  The question of whether the 
claim should have been preempted does not sit on the nature 
of the issue, be it factual or legal, but rather on the necessity 
of interpretation of the CBA, which ultimately existed in this 
case.  
1. Definition of ―Employer‖ 
Although the court may have been proper in rejecting the 
alternative procedures argument145––because the court can 
easily look to what the NFL did, rather than analyze the 
actual provisions of the CBA––the court should not have so 
 
 140. Id. at 881 (citing Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp, 500 F.3d 828, 832 (8th Cir. 2007)). 
 141. See id. at 881–83. 
 142. See id.  For a full discussion of the state common law claims, see supra Part 
II.B. 
 143. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 876. 
 144. See id. at 881–83. 
 145. For a discussion of the NFL‘s argument, see supra Part II.A. 
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quickly discarded preemption founded upon the NFL‘s alleged 
status as employer.146  In rejecting the possibility of 
preemption, the Eighth Circuit found that defining the NFL‘s 
status as employer merely necessitated reference to the 
preamble of the CBA, including the term ‗employer‘ and 
references to ‗employment,‘ as well as individual employment 
contracts.147  If the Williamses had alleged violations of the 
CBA, this rationale would prove viable; for purposes of the 
agreement, a reference in it would certainly be binding.  The 
claim, however, was not based upon the CBA, but instead 
based on two state statutes, and the Supreme Court has 
continuously noted that section 301 preemption is about 
resolution of the actual claim.148 
In its disposition, the Eighth Circuit seemingly 
disregarded state substantive law for determining an 
employment relationship.  As set forth by Judge Larson on 
remand, Minnesota recognizes a five factor test to determine 
whether an employer-employee relationship exists for 
purposes of state law: ―(1) the right to control the means and 
manner of performance; (2) the mode of payment; (3) the 
furnishing of materials or tools; (4) the control of the premises 
where the work is done; and (5) the right of the employer to 
discharge.‖149  Upon remand, the district court, held that the 
NFL was in fact the employer for purposes of the DATWA 
because of the NFL‘s ―‗sufficient control over the work‘ of [the] 
employees[,]‖ as defined through sections of the CBA.150  As 
the most important factor to consider being ―the right to 
control the means and manner of performance,‖151 Judge 
Larson noted not only the control that the NFL had already 
 
 146. In his dissent from a denial of a rehearing en banc, Chief Judge Loken also 
argued that the NFL‘s employer status depends upon interpretation of the CBA.  See 
Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 598 F.3d 932, 932 (8th Cir. 2009) (Loken, C.J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).  Chief Judge Loken does not denote a 
statutory or common law basis for his finding, but does importantly note that ―[a] 
proper answer requires analysis of the [CBA] between the NFL and the NFLPA, the 
NFL Constitution and Bylaws, and the Standard Player Contract between the players 
and the Vikings.‖  Id.   
 147. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 877. 
 148. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 395 (1987). 
 149. Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, No. 27-CV-08-29778, at *17 (Minn. 4th D. 
May 6, 2010), available at http://www.courts.state.mn.us/Documents/4/Public/News/ 
Orders/Williamses_v_NFL_Findings_and_Final_Order.pdf (citing Guhlke v. Roberts 
Truck Lines, 128 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Minn. 1964)). 
 150. Id. at *16. 
 151. Guhlke, 128 N.W.2d at 326 (emphasis added). 
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displayed over the players, but also, and more importantly, 
the control granted to the NFL through the CBA.152  The 
district court looked to the many rights granted through the 
CBA in conjunction with one another to determine the totality 
of control.153  The court did not merely reference each 
individual section of the CBA as it is allowed to do,154 but 
actually determined if that section qualifies as indicative of 
―the right to control the means and manner of performance,‖ 
or any other factor of control.155  Such an interpretation as to 
the nature of the terms of the CBA by a state court judge 
under state law is strictly prohibited where the parties to the 
action expressly called for adjudication of the claim by an 
arbitrator.156  As such, the NFL‘s status as employer of the 
Williamses, for purposes of the DATWA, was and continues to 
be ―inextricably intertwined‖157 with the CBA, and thus 
should have been preempted under section 301. 
2. Bona Fide Occupational Requirements 
The CPA, one of the two statutes at issue, says that, 
although generally an employer may not fire an employee due 
to the use of legal products, off premises, during non-working 
hours, such a restriction is allowed if it ―relates to a bona fide 
occupational requirement and is reasonably related to 
employment activities.‖158  A bona fide occupation 
requirement derives from the relationship between the 
parties, the factor allowing for preemption of the common law 
claims.  For example, a professional athlete physically 
competing on the field likely realizes he or she is going to be 
tested more stringently for performance enhancing drugs 
than a businessperson, because the integrity of the sport is 
maintained by making sure that fans are not suspicious of a 
game or season‘s outcome.  Thus, the NFL‘s drug testing 
policy must be interpreted to determine whether a bona fide 
 
 152. See Williams, No. 27-CV-08-29778, at *17–23. 
 153. See id.   
 154. See Trs. of Twin City Bricklayers Fringe Benefit Funds v. Superior 
Waterproofing, Inc., 450 F.3d 324, 330 (2006). 
 155. Guhlke, 128 N.W.2d at 326. 
 156. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 404 n.3 (1988) (citing 
Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am. v. Lucas Flour Co., 
369 U.S. 95, 103–04 (1962)). 
 157. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985). 
 158. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.938(2)–(3)(a)(1) (2009). 
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occupational requirement exists.  In the end, the question of 
preemption depends largely upon the need for interpretation 
of a CBA to resolve a state common or statutory claim.  
Although the inquiry about the bona fide occupation 
requirement is factual, this point alone cannot prevent 
preemption.  Similar to the common law claims, all of which 
relied on factual determinations correctly preempted by the 
Eighth Circuit,159 the statutory claims requiring an analysis of 
the bona fide occupation requirement should also be 
preempted when their resolution depends upon interpretation 
of the CBA, devoid of their factual nature. 
B.  Section 301 Preemption and Its Effect on Affirmative 
Defenses 
Noting that the statutes at issue require interpretation of 
the Policy, the importance of these statutory clauses depends 
greatly upon the role of defenses in issues of preemption.  The 
jurisprudence regarding the breadth of interpretation under 
section 301 is relatively evenly split within the Eighth 
Circuit––some cases take a broad approach, while others, a 
narrow approach.160  Under the narrow interpretation, a court 
may look only to the face of the complaint to determine 
whether the claim should be preempted under section 301.161  
In taking the narrow approach, the court reasons that the 
plaintiff is the master of the complaint, and thus should be 
able to plead it in such a manner as to keep the issue in state 
court.162  If a very narrow approach to section 301 preemption 
doctrine is taken by the courts, then the bona fide 
occupational requirement will be seen as a ‗defense‘ and 
defenses may not be viewed when determining preemption 
issues.  The Eighth Circuit has also taken a broader 
approach.163  That broader view was outlined in Johnson v. 
 
 159. See Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 881–83 (8th Cir. 2009), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 566 (2010). 
 160. Compare Bogan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 500 F.3d 828 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding a 
narrow approach appropriate), and Meyer v. Schnucks Markets, Inc., 163 F.3d 1048 
(8th Cir. 1998) (finding a narrow approach appropriate), with Gore v. TWA, 210 F.3d 
944 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding a broad approach appropriate), and Johnson v. Anheuser 
Busch, Inc., 876 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding a broad approach appropriate). 
 161. See Schnucks Markets, 163 F.3d at 1051. 
 162. See id. at 1050.  
 163. See generally Gore, 210 F.3d 944; see also generally Anheuser Busch, 876 F.2d. 
620. 
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Anheuser Busch, Inc.164  Such an approach requires the court 
to look beyond the face of the complaint, using anticipated 
defenses and other means to determine whether the claim 
should be preempted under section 301.165 
In finding the narrow approach more appropriate, the 
Williams court held that it more closely parallels Supreme 
Court precedent.166  The primary problem with the court‘s 
reasoning in accepting the narrow approach is that Williams 
erroneously applies the principles of removal preemption 
where it should have analyzed the principles of ordinary 
preemption.167  In holding that it may not view defenses to 
determine preemption, the Eighth Circuit relies on 
Caterpillar v. Williams.168  Although the Supreme Court in 
Caterpillar clearly states that a ―defendant cannot, merely by 
injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is 
plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one 
arising under federal law, thereby selecting the forum in 
which the claim shall be litigated,‖169 this finding speaks only 
to the principle of removal preemption.  Critically, removal 
preemption speaks not to which court may adjudicate or what 
law that court may apply, but only to the whether the claim 
may be, when originally brought in state court, removed to 
federal court.170 
Apart from the removal preemption doctrine, there exists 
a separate ordinary preemption doctrine.  Ordinary 
preemption is a substantive principle that displaces state law 
with federal substantive law, regardless of the venue.171  In 
Williams, the NFL did not challenge the venue itself; the 
argument set forth by the NFL spoke only to ordinary 
preemption.  The Supreme Court has correctly recognized the 
distinction between the two principles, and allows courts to 
 
 164. 876 F.2d at 623. 
 165. See id. (citing Hanks v. Gen. Motors Corp., 859 F.2d 67, 70 (8th Cir. 1988)). 
 166. See Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 879 n.13 (8th Cir. 2009), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 566 (2010). 
 167. See Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, 598 F.3d 932, 935 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(Colloton, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (designating the alternative 
forms of preemption as ―ordinary‖ and ―complete‖ preemption). 
 168. See Williams, 582 F.3d at 879 n.13. 
 169. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 399 (1987). 
 170. See Michael C. Harper, Symposium on Labor Arbitration Thirty Years After the 
Steel Workers Trilogy: Limiting Section 301 Preemption: Three Cheers for the Trilogy, 
Only One for Lingle and Lueck, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 685, 719 (1990). 
 171. See id. 
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look past the face of the complaint in determining ordinary 
preemption issues.172  In fact, Caterpillar, the case from which 
Williams pulls its support, distinguishes between the two 
doctrines noting that ―[t]he fact that a defendant might 
ultimately prove that a plaintiff‘s claims are pre-empted 
under the NLRA does not establish that they are removable to 
federal court.‖173   
Earlier, in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., a 
case that sets forth the outer barriers of section 301 
preemption, the Supreme Court took time to discuss the 
purpose and construction of the doctrine of section 301.174  In 
footnote three the Supreme Court reiterated: 
It was apparently the theory of the Washington court that, 
although Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 . . . 
requires the federal courts to fashion, from the policy of our 
national labor laws, a body of federal law for the enforcement of 
[CBAs], nonetheless, the courts of the States remain free to apply 
individualized local rules when called upon to enforce such 
agreements.  This view cannot be accepted.  The dimensions of 
[section] 301 require the conclusion that substantive principles of 
federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the 
statute . . . .  
The possibility that individual contract terms might have different 
meanings under state and federal law would inevitably exert a 
disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and administration 
of collective agreements.  Once the collective bargain was made, the 
possibility of conflicting substantive interpretation under 
competing legal systems would tend to stimulate and prolong 
disputes as to its interpretation. Indeed, the existence of possibly 
conflicting legal concepts might substantially impede the parties’ 
willingness to agree to contract terms providing for final arbitral or 
judicial resolution of disputes. 
 The importance of the area which would be affected by separate 
systems of substantive law makes the need for a single body of 
federal law particularly compelling . . . . State law which frustrates 
the effort of Congress to stimulate the smooth functioning of that 
process thus strikes at the very core of federal labor policy.  With 
due regard to the many factors which bear upon competing state 
and federal interests in this area . . . , we cannot but conclude that 
in enacting [section] 301 Congress intended doctrines of federal 
 
 172. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 404 n.3 (1988)  
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labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules.175 
The Supreme Court in turn mandated preemption where 
―the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the 
meaning of a [CBA] . . . .‖176  Resolution of a claim does not 
merely depend upon the claim itself, but instead upon 
potential defenses.  As the heart of section 301 preemption is 
to keep any interpretation of a CBA out of the hands of state 
judges177—not just interpretation which falls on the face of the 
complaint—allowing state courts to interpret these defenses 
in applying state substantive law runs counter to the focus of 
this doctrine.   
Indicative of the impropriety of the Eighth Circuit‘s 
decision is the subsequent disposition, by the district court, of 
the substantive claim.178  Upon remand, the district court 
summarily dismissed the Williamses‘ claim against the NFL 
for allegedly violating the CPA, finding a bona fide 
occupational requirement existed, the purported defense to 
the claim.179  The Williamses should not have been able to 
avoid the ―extraordinary preemptive power‖180 of section 301 
by cleverly pleading a complaint; especially where a 
legitimate defense, necessary to determine the validity of the 
claim, turned on an interpretation of the CBA.  If the Eighth 
Circuit had properly analyzed the Supreme Court precedent, 
and focused on Congress‘s intent through section 301, the 
defenses would have needed to be examined, and the 
statutory claims would have a fortiori been preempted.  
 
 
 
 
 175. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. at 103–04). 
 176. Id. at 405–06 (emphasis added). 
 177. See Drummonds, supra note 29, at 164.   
 178. See generally Williams v. Nat‘l Football League, No. 27-CV-08-29778, at *17 
(Minn. 4th D. May 6, 2010), available at http://www.courts.state.mn.us/Documents/4/ 
Public/News/Orders/Williamses_v_NFL_Findings_and_Final_Order.pdf. 
 179. See id. at *38–39.  For a discussion on the interpretation involved in the CPA 
claim, see supra Part IV.A.2. 
 180. Shane v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 868 F.2d 1057, 1062 (8th Cir. 1986); see also 
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (citing Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 
No. 735, 88 S. Ct. 1235, 1236 (1968)). 
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V.  ARBITRATION AND SECTION 301 
The NFL CBA contains a specific grievance procedure for 
non-injury based claims by players.181  Article IX of the CBA 
outlines the non-injury grievance procedures for the NFL and 
calls for appeals from the NFL‘s internal grievance procedure 
to go to binding arbitration.182  The type of arbitration 
provision called for in the CBA is exactly what Congress 
hoped to encourage in promulgating section 301.183  As noted 
above, the impetus of section 301 preemption is to create a 
common body of law as well as a common forum in which to 
resolve labor claims dependent upon interpretation of the 
terms of a CBA.184  Because the Eighth Circuit, as well as the 
Ninth Circuit,185 continually misapplies section 301, the 
courts have slowly eroded the role of arbitrators in labor 
cases.  Instead, federal judges, and even less appropriately, 
state judges have interpreted terms of the CBA—exactly what 
section 301 preemption urges against.   
Although the NFL did not argue that a valid arbitration 
clause was in place, the impropriety of the Eighth Circuit‘s 
decision brings to light specific issues of forum waiver in labor 
conflicts.  The type of provision contained in the NFL CBA 
requires binding arbitration only when the claim requires 
CBA interpretation.186  Thus, when the Eighth Circuit found 
that resolution of the statutory claim did not require the court 
to interpret the CBA, the court did not have to send the claim 
to arbitration.  But, as noted, the statutory claims did in fact 
require interpretation of the CBA, and the court should have 
sent the claims to arbitration.  In order to reestablish the role 
of arbitration, unions and employers should be able to 
collectively bargain for binding arbitration of statutory 
claims.187  The ability, however, to bargain for such a forum 
 
 181. See NFL MGMT COUNCIL & NFL PLAYERS ASS‘N, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENT 2006–2012, Art. IX, 23–27 (Mar. 8, 2006), http://images.nflplayers.com/ 
mediaResources/files/PDFs/General/NFL%20COLLECTIVE%20BARGAINING%20AGR
EEMENT%202006%20-%202012.pdf [hereinafter NFL CBA]. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See supra Part I.B.3.  
 184. See supra Part I.B.3 and accompanying text. 
 185. See generally Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(finding defenses irrelevant in determining questions of section 301 preemption). 
 186. See NFL CBA, supra note 181, at Art. IX, Sec. 1. 
 187. As noted above, see supra notes 65–68, section 203(d) of the LMRA calls for use 
of the forum decided upon by the parties involved.  The problem is section 203(d) only 
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waiver, depends upon the jurisprudence surrounding 
arbitration.   
A.  Enforceability of Arbitration Provisions in Collective 
Bargaining Agreements 
In 1920, the Supreme Court decided three cases 
(collectively known as ―The Steelworker‘s Trilogy‖) that 
established the federal policy in favor of arbitration as the 
forum for resolution of labor disputes.188  In deciding the 
Steelworker‘s Trilogy, the Court turned a firm stance, and 
recognized that, unless an arbitrator‘s award does not draw 
its essence from the CBA, then a court must uphold the 
arbitrator‘s award.189  These decisions recognized the 
importance of arbitration and generally called for the 
enforceability of arbitration clauses. 
Even with the federal policy favoring arbitration, until 
recently, it seemed as though there was little hope for 
unionized parties seeking to arbitrate statutory claims.  While 
the Supreme Court extended the scope of arbitration clauses, 
the Court still feared the differing interests of individual 
employees and their representative unions and disallowed 
union waiver of an individual employee‘s judicial forum of 
statutory claims.190   
Then, in 2009, the Supreme Court outlined an exception to 
the general rule of non-waiver.  In 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, the 
Supreme Court recognized that unions could waive the 
judicial forum in favor of arbitration for federal 
antidiscrimination claims.191 Pyett involved the Realty 
Advisory Board on Labor Relations (―RAB‖) and the Service 
 
comes into play when a court finds the claims preempted by section 301.  See Joshua A. 
Reece, Note, Throwing the Red Flag on the Commissioner:  How Independent 
Arbitrators Can Fit into the NFL’s Off-Field Discipline Procedures Under the NFL 
Collective Bargaining Agreement, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 359, 367 n.46 (2010).  Allowing 
parties to collectively bargain for a forum waiver clause will avoid the judicial forum 
altogether; parties will go directly to arbitration. 
 188. See generally United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United 
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigating Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United 
Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). 
 189. See generally Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564; Warrior & Gulf Navigating Co., 363 
U.S. 574; Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593. 
 190. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding that an 
employee does not lose the judicial forum after a claim goes through an arbitral 
proceeding). 
 191. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009). 
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Employees International Union, Local 32BJ (―Union‖) 
entering into an industry-wide CBA requiring union members 
to submit all employment discrimination claims, including 
those under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), to binding arbitration.192  14 Penn Plaza, a member 
of the RAB, owned the building where respondents worked.193  
Temco Service Industries, Inc., respondents‘ direct employer, 
reassigned respondent‘s jobs after 14 Penn Plaza hired 
Spartan Security.194  The Union filed grievances alleging 
various violations of the CBA.195  After withdrawing the age-
discrimination claims from arbitration, the respondents 
alleged a violation of the ADEA in the district court.196  The 
petitioners sought to compel arbitration based on the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA).197  The district court denied the 
motion, and the Second Circuit affirmed.198 
The Supreme Court then reversed and remanded the 
decision, holding that ―there is no legal basis for the Court to 
strike down the arbitration clause in this CBA, which was 
freely negotiated by the Union and the RAB, and which 
clearly and unmistakably requires respondents to arbitrate 
the age-discrimination claims at issue . . . .‖199  In coming to 
this conclusion, and allowing for waiver of the judicial forum 
through a CBA, the Court recognized that unions—as 
exclusive bargaining agents for employees—should be able to 
negotiate for arbitration, as arbitration clauses are a 
condition of employment, and thus a mandatory subject of 
bargaining.200  In allowing for such a waiver, the Court also 
noted that individual employees would not lose their 
discrimination claims in arbitration, but instead just lose the 
judicial forum itself.201  The Supreme Court also recognized 
that bargaining parties must ―clearly and unmistakably‖ 
waive the statutory claim in the arbitration provision in order 
to make it enforceable;202 however, the Court in Pyett refused 
 
 192. See id. at 1461. 
 193. See id.  
 194. See id. at 1461–62. 
 195. See id. at 1462. 
 196. See id.  
 197. See 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1462. 
 198. See id. at 1462–63. 
 199. Id. at 1466. 
 200. See id. at 1463–64. 
 201. See id. at 1469. 
 202. Id. at 1473–74. 
DEMURO_ARBITRATION 7/16/2011  7:06 PM 
494 Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 21.2 
to analyze what constitutes clear and unmistakable waiver.203  
Thus, lower courts are still free to interpret what ―clearly and 
unmistakably‖ entails. 
B.  Extending the Decision in Pyett to the Waiver of State 
Statutory Claims 
The Supreme Court‘s decision in Pyett—which was limited 
to waiver of federal ADEA claims—can, and should be 
extended in order to further effectuate the policies behind 
section 301.  Cases analyzing arbitration clauses have become 
more accepting of the use of arbitration as a forum for 
resolution of claims.204  The Pyett decision relies upon a 
number of cases, which use the FAA,205 as a statutory basis 
for waiver of the judicial forum.206  Although labor arbitration 
derives from a different source than the FAA, the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that the FAA applies to almost all 
contracts of employment.207  As such, the FAA can and should 
 
 203. See 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1473–74. 
 204. Originally, the Supreme Court did not allow waiver of the judicial forum for 
federal statutory claims.  See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (disallowing waiver of 
the judicial forum for claims brought under the Securities Act). Despite initial 
resistance to forum waiver, the Supreme Court later overruled the holding in Wilko, 
and held that courts should presume federal statutory claims are arbitrable.  See 
generally Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 
(1985).   
 205. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006) 
 206. See generally 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (relying upon, e.g., Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), and Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) to allow for union waiver of 
the judicial forum).   
 207. Circuit City v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).  The FAA, first enacted in 1925, 
applies to ―any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce.‖  § 2.  Section 1 of the FAA further defines commerce by stating: 
‗[C]ommerce‘, as herein defined, means commerce among the several States or 
with foreign nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District 
of Columbia, or between any such Territory and another, or between any such 
Territory and any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia 
and any State or Territory or foreign nation, but nothing herein contained 
shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any 
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce. 
§ 1. (emphasis added).  Because of the exempting language contained in section 1, 
courts spent many years trying to determine the limits of the FAA exemption of 
employment contracts.  In 2001 the Supreme Court finally answered that question.  
The Court in Circuit City v. Adams, held that section 1 of the FAA only applies to 
transportation employment contracts; all other employment contracts are subject to the 
provisions of the FAA.  532 U.S. 105.  This means that most arbitration clauses 
contained in employment contracts are in fact enforceable under the FAA.   
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continue to provide a basis for waiver of state statutory 
claims.  The jurisprudence of the FAA currently allows for 
arbitration of state statutory claims.208  The Supreme Court 
has even recognized that the FAA preempts state statutes 
that discriminate against arbitration clauses.209  In fact, even 
if a contract has a state choice of law provision, courts will 
uphold arbitration provisions unless the parties specifically 
call for the choice of law provision to apply to arbitration.210  
Allowing for a waiver of state statutory claims is a natural 
extension of the arbitration jurisprudence already in place.  
The Minnesota statutes at issue in Williams do not contain 
any provisions disallowing arbitration of the statutory 
claim.211  As such, unions should be able to waive the judicial 
forum in favor of arbitration for state statutory claims, 
specifically drug testing statutes.  Because the Supreme 
Court did not specifically define clear and unmistakable 
waiver, a reasonable interpretation would be one that puts all 
parties represented on notice of which statutory provisions 
are waived.  The NFL and NFLPA, for example, could state—
in the CBA—that ―The NFL agrees to comply with all state 
statutory drug testing provisions, present or hereafter 
enacted, to the extent it is legally required to do so.  Any and 
all claims arising under those provisions shall be subject to 
the grievance and arbitration procedures provided herein as 
the sole and exclusive remedy for violations.  Arbitrators shall 
apply any and all appropriate law in rendering decisions 
based on these claims.‖  After including such language, the 
CBA could cross-reference to the Policy, where it could include 
a non-exhaustive list of such drug testing provisions.  Such 
language would provide appropriate notice to all members of 
the NFLPA that their representative union waived the 
judicial forum, favoring instead arbitration of drug testing 
statutory claims. 
 
 208. See generally Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (calling for arbitration of 
all claims agreed to under state law, including a state statutory claim). 
 209. See generally Doctor‘s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1995) (holding 
that a first page notice requirement applicable only to arbitration clauses is 
inconsistent with the FAA and is therefore displaced). 
 210. See generally Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 
(1995) (finding that the choice of law provision intended to only incorporate ―New 
York‘s substantive rights and obligations, and not the state‘s allocation of power 
between tribunals‖). 
 211. See generally MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.950–.957 (2009); see generally also id. § 
181.938. 
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Such waiver also allows arbitrators to be the ones to apply 
section 301 in determining the underlying claim.  As 
arbitrators in labor cases are quite familiar with what 
―interpretation‖ of a CBA actually entails, these individuals 
are more likely to properly enforce section 301 preemption 
and use a broad approach, taking defenses into account.  
Again, by waiving the statutory forum, individuals will not 
lose their substantive claim; instead, they simply agree to a 
specific forum to resolve their claims, a forum that the 
Supreme Court has affirmatively recognized as an acceptable 
forum for the resolution of statutory claims.  
CONCLUSION 
Drug testing has become a topic at the forefront of the 
sports industry.  Concerns with the effects that drug use has 
on the players, the integrity of the sports leagues, and the 
potential trickle-down effect on America‘s youth has caused 
leagues to institute stringent strict liability standards and 
respectively strong discipline.  The Eighth Circuit in Williams 
v. National Football League did not defer to these collectively 
bargained for agreements, and instead allowed for players to 
take state action.  By failing to extend the reasoning of the 
common law claims to the statutory claims and 
misinterpreting Supreme Court precedent, the Eighth Circuit 
has placed professional sports leagues in a position of fear of 
litigation.   
Both leagues and players, through their respective player‘s 
associations, should be able to reach an agreement regarding 
drug testing terms, place them in a collectively bargained for 
agreement, and then subsequently rely on these procedures 
and discipline.  The NFL followed the intent of Congress, 
strengthened drug testing policies and in return, it was sued.  
Section 301 is intended to deal with such cases, and in order 
for the intent of Congress to be fully realized, professional 
sports leagues must be able to continue collectively 
bargaining for drug testing policies without fear of potential 
state litigation.   
Although it does not resolve the issue of improper 
application of section 301 preemption, allowing unions and 
employers to waive the judicial forum in favor of arbitration 
can act as a first step towards the fulfillment of congressional 
intent in labor adjudication.  Arbitrators have experience 
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interpreting CBAs; they know when interpretation of the CBA 
is necessary to the resolution of a statutory claim, and thus 
are likely to properly apply section 301.  Even in instances in 
which the arbitrator follows a narrow approach—which is 
contrary to the substantive law of section 301—having the 
arbitrator be the one to decide follows the congressional 
intent regarding forum of adjudication.  Until the Supreme 
Court resolves the split among the circuits regarding section 
301 preemption, allowing arbitrators to resolve the entire 
statutory claim, as well as preemption issues, encourages 
proper adjudication of claims pursuant to section 301 of the 
LMRA. 
 
